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Media Wars and the New Left:
Governability and Media Democratisation
in Argentina and Brazil
PHILIP KITZBERGER*
Abstract. This article examines the determinants of government strategies towards
dominant media actors in the light of increased questioning of the media’s role in
democratic politics. It compares the first two Kirchnerist presidencies in Argentina
with the first two PT-led governments in Brazil. While these governments initially
adopted accommodation strategies, political crises subsequently disturbed the coexist-
ence of media and government, triggering divergent responses. The study offers an
account of media policy options and shifts based upon (i) constraints stemming
from political-structural variables, (ii) governmental perceptions of oppositional
media power and of civil society allies’ strength and (iii) learning from critical junc-
tures that reshaped policy preferences. In sum, the article provides insights into the
ways the media realm has become an arena of political struggle in Latin America.
Keywords: Clarín, Globo, Mensalão, media politics, left turn
Introduction
A common feature of the recent wave of left-leaning governments in Latin
America has been the eruption of intense ‘media wars’, which have raised
questions about their causes and the consequences for democracy. Growing
mediatisation combined with persistent elitism and ownership concentration
in Latin America’s media systems have often been advanced as an explanation.
The occurrence of open conflicts and their degree of radicalism have in turn
been connected to the populist or social-democratic nature of the governments
involved.
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I focus here on the determinants of governmental strategies towards dom-
inant media actors in contexts of increased questioning of the media’s role in
democratic politics. I argue that besides prior political identities, ideological
beliefs and policy preferences regarding the media, the adoption of confronta-
tional counter-hegemonic or accommodation strategies depends on particular
constraints, opportunities and perceptions. The leftist governments had to
balance the demands of media democratisation to which they were committed
with concerns for governability.
I compare the two first Kirchnerist presidencies in Argentina with the two
first Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT) led governments in
Brazil. The cases comprise Néstor Kirchner’s presidency (–) and
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s first presidency (–) on the one
hand and Luis Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva’s two terms (–) on the other.
Despite their differences in terms of identity and path to power, the initial
phases of these governments were strikingly similar regarding their media pol-
itics. In fact, Lula and Kirchner each inaugurated their presidencies in  by
adopting an accommodation strategy towards their country’s dominant media
organisations. These pragmatic approaches were reflected in political decisions
favouring Globo and Clarín, Brazil and Argentina’s largest media organisa-
tions, and in the preferential treatment given to their journalistic outlets.
In both cases, political crises, the Mensalão scandal in Brazil  and
Argentina’s agrarian conflict in , shook this initial equilibrium, shifting
the way these outlets covered government. However, the two governments
responded differently to these new scenarios. Against what might be expected,
the government that emerged politically weakened in the aftermath of the
crisis opted for a radical confrontation; while in Brazil the PT-led government,
bolstered after the  electoral triumph, chose a comparatively moderate
course of action. As I will show, while Lula abandoned the former accommo-
dation strategy after , he did not enter into the overt war with leading
media players that has characterised Kirchnerism since . These divergent
reactions require explanation. Based on primary and secondary sources, I offer
an account of media policy options and shifts. I first seek to determine con-
straints stemming from political-structural variables such as (i) the existing
congressional correlations of forces, (ii) the linkages between political and
media elites, (iii) the way electoral systems affect media influence upon legis-
lators and (iv) the level of media sector interest group organisation. I then
stress the role of the perceived availability and strength of progressive allies
in civil society and media activist organisations, and of the politicians’ subject-
ive assessments of media power. These last two factors, I will show, are not
static but vary upon learning from critical junctures. Reconstructing the way
 I interviewed over  government officials, media activists, journalists and experts involved in
the policy-making process in Argentina and Brazil between  and .
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governments interpreted certain key episodes helps illuminate the rationale
behind the strategies adopted.
Government and Media
Variation in governmental media strategies in the context of Latin America’s
‘left turn’ has often been described but seldom theorised. Most accounts estab-
lish a connection between radical confrontational strategies towards the estab-
lished media and the populist variant of leftist governments. Waisbord argues
that Latin American populists share a view of the media that is rooted in a
mixture of Marxism and nationalism: the media are the powerful instruments
of domination of anti-popular minorities. Such a view supports a call for
radical reforms. While not denying other intervening factors, this perspective
suggests that ideas and beliefs play a prominent role in policy formation.
This view, however, does not account for the cases. Lula, his inner circle and
the PT in general shared critical beliefs about the media as elite or class actors,
and advocated media democratisation reforms. The Kirchners, in contrast,
had no previous public commitments on the subject. Still, the latter eventually
pushed for an aggressive reform, whereas the former did not translate their
ideological commitments into policy.
Furthermore, programmatic beliefs about the media do not explain why
both governments initially accommodated media interests and why, in the
aftermath of equivalent crises, both recast their strategies in the ways they
did. If ideas are the primary factors shaping governmental choices, then polit-
ical actors should be much less sensitive to external environments than appears
to be the case. This is not to say that ideas play no role at all, but that they do
so only under favourable conditions. Ideas do affect the ways in which actors
make sense of the world they face; political-institutional settings and vested
interests condition their viability.
Turning away from voluntaristic accounts of policy choices as simple expres-
sions of ideological preferences, scholarly research on the variations in the way
 Silvio Waisbord, ‘Between Support and Confrontation: Civic Society, Media Reform and
Populism in Latin America’, Communications, Culture & Critique,  (), pp. –;
Voxpopulista. Medios, periodismo y democracia (Buenos Aires: Gedisa, ); Philip
Kitzberger, ‘The Media Activism of Latin America’s Leftist Governments: Does Ideology
Matter?’, GIGA Working Paper, No.  ().
 Margaret Keck, The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, ). See also, the  electoral programme, available at http://www.
fpabramo.org.br/uploads/democracia.pdf.
 Sheri Berman, The Social Democratic Moment. Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar
Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ).
 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, ‘Why and How Ideas Matter’, in Robert Goodin and Charles Tilly
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis (New York: Oxford University
Press, ), pp. –.
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the Latin American Left actually governs has focused instead on the context.
Economic and social policy variation, especially the degree of radicalism and
elite defiance, has been explained by politico-institutional variables such as
path to power, party system and political competition patterns. Several
studies on Brazil have reconstructed the political constraints and veto points
that curtailed the ability of the PT-led government to translate its preferences
into policy. These ‘hard’ institutional factors influence governmental percep-
tions of the political viability of different policy options vis-à-vis the media.
Outside formal political institutions, media institutions can themselves
function as constraints or even veto players. In Latin America’s instrumentalist
media cultures, large media conglomerates constitute strategic actors for gov-
ernability. Since they concentrate control over key resources (ideas, informa-
tion, public agendas, legitimacy and reputations) and have the ability to act
en bloc to pursue their interests, they potentially influence effective policy-
making and, eventually, the ability of a government to stay in power. In
the media actors’ case, the subjective dimension of constraints, the fact that
they are perceived rather than objective, becomes clear. Media power is, ultim-
ately, reputational power: ‘As long as politicians … believe that media has
great effects, they will usually act in consequence. At the regional level,
Latin American politicians perceive huge media influences on policy making.’
In contrast to understandings of the media originating from ideologies,
these perceptions are usually forged contextually along paths to power.
However, the ways in which media power reputations coexist or compete
with ideological beliefs, and how they affect strategic shifts, cannot be
settled merely through static descriptions of institutional constraints or gov-
ernmental beliefs about the media. While important, pre-existing beliefs
must instead be examined in their interplay with short-term experiences and
with challenges faced during the governing process. Therefore timing-sensitive
narratives illuminate how such developments reinforce or alter pre-held beliefs,
and how they influence the way in which governmental decision-makers evalu-
ate correlations of forces and their own chances of survival, adjusting their
strategies accordingly.
 Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (eds.), The Resurgence of the Latin American Left
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, ).
 Hernán Gómez Bruera, Lula, the Workers’ Party and the Governability Dilemma in Brazil
(New York: Routledge, ); Wendy Hunter, The Transformation of the Workers’ Party
in Brazil, – (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
 For a discussion on governability and strategic actors see Gómez Bruera, Lula, the Workers
Party and Governability, chap. ; Michael Coppedge, ‘Instituciones y gobernabilidad
democrática en América Latina’, Síntesis,  (), pp. –.
 Sallie Hughes and Paola Prado, ‘Media Diversity and Social Inequality in Latin America’, in
Merike Blofield (ed.), The Great Gap: Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Latin
America (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, ), p. .
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I will hypothesise two such learning processes affecting governmental per-
ceptions and strategic choices. The first consists of episodes that impact on
the government’s evaluations regarding the availability and effectiveness of
allies in civil society for certain courses of action. When considering choices,
governments estimate the likely availability of support for an eventual
switch towards confronting established actors. Defying the dominant
media assumes that one has the capacity to mobilise credible voices and to
resist hostile narratives in the media-dominated public sphere.
The second learning process concerns the dynamics of media power percep-
tions. The real influence that media content has on public attitudes and behav-
iour is constitutively opaque. Governments fill this cognitive gap with
judgements of causality instead. Sequences of events influence how judgements
about likely media effects are constructed. In the present experiment, both gov-
ernments were placed in a setting of sudden media coverage that was perceived
by them as hostile, followed later by elections. The electoral results gave the
governments a measure of media power. The causal force assigned to media
coverage, in turn, informed these governments’ assessments of their prospects
for survival, and is central in reconstructing the rationale underlying their stra-
tegic choices and shifts.
Parallel Developments
By , Argentina’s and Brazil’s media systems were, like most of Latin
America’s, exhibiting high levels of audience and ownership concentration
and a persistently elitist character. Both media systems were characterised by
the presence of dominant, family-controlled media conglomerates.
Through its alliance with the military regime, by the s Roberto
Marinho’s Rede Globo had achieved absolute dominance in Brazil’s television
market, averaging a  per cent share of the national audience. The first direct
presidential race in , in which Lula was defeated by Fernando Collor, to
whom the network was committed, represented the apex of TV Globo’s pol-
itical influence. Throughout the s, opportunities for competitors opened
up. However, until  TV Globo managed to keep its audience share above
 per cent, far above the  per cent of its nearest rival. By , with 
stations or affiliates, the network was reaching  million homes. In 
its total revenue was triple that of the country’s second and third networks,
and it received over half of Brazil’s advertising budget. The conglomerate add-
itionally controlled newspapers, newsweeklies, radio stations, pay-TV net-
works, production companies and other interests in cultural industries.
However, TV Globo’s hegemonic position rested not only on its overall size
 Gómez Bruera, Lula, the Workers Party and Governability, pp. –.
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but also on its communicative-symbolic power. Its newscast, the Jornal
Nacional (JN), the first to be aired simultaneously on all affiliate stations in
, played a central role in consolidating a sense of national identity, and
since then it has been by far the most influential national news provider
and agenda setter. In addition to its TV journalism, Globo’s telenovelas
have had an unprecedented influence on Brazilian popular culture.
Argentina’s Clarín started as a modest newspaper in . It was only
during the s that it began to expand. Clarín’s pragmatic ties to the mili-
tary regime led to an association with the state in the production of newsprint.
By the s it had become the country’s largest and most influential daily. Its
expansion and the parallel crisis of traditional political actors increased
Clarín’s autonomy from the political field and enhanced its capacity to organ-
ise the public agenda. The liberalisation and privatisation process initiated in
 under Carlos Menem began its transformation into a multimedia con-
glomerate. The removal of cross-media ownership restrictions enabled the
newspaper to move into the broadcasting sector, where it acquired leading tele-
vision and radio stations.
Throughout the s the Clarín Group expanded from publishing and
broadcasting to cable TV and internet provision, news agencies, audio-visual
production and soccer transmission, among other interests. Controlled by
Ernestina Herrera de Noble, the founder’s widow, and Hector Magnetto,
its CEO, the group became one of the country’s leading economic conglom-
erates. Since  it has been financed through international capital markets.
Its undisputed ascendancy in public agenda and opinion formation has been
made possible by its multiple popular outlets and by its prestigious news
media’s capacity to act in a coordinated fashion, headed by its newspaper
and its -hour news channel.
The politics of accommodation
The electoral triumphs of Lula in  and Kirchner in  formed part of
the initial wave of leftist victories that occurred in the context of the regional
economic downturn from  to . Despite their different paths,
Kirchner, a Peronist from a remote province, emerged in the aftermath of
 John Sinclair, Latin American Television. A Global View (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
); Elizabeth Fox and Silvio Waisbord (eds.), Latin Politics, Global Media (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, ); Venício Lima, Mídia. Crise política e poder no Brasil (São
Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, ); Mauro Porto,Media Power and Democratization in
Brazil. TV Globo and the Dilemmas of Political Accountability (New York: Routledge, ).
 Martín Sivak, Clarín. El gran diario argentino. Una historia (Buenos Aires: Planeta, );
Guillermo Mastrini and Martín Becerra, Periodistas y magnates. Estructura y concentración
de las industrias culturales en América Latina (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, ); Fox and
Waisbord, Latin Politics.
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the  crisis as a political outsider; Lula, a union and leftist party leader, fol-
lowed a gradual party-institutional route. Both rose to government promising
an alternative to neoliberalism. However, these promises coexisted with con-
cerns about governability, creating important incentives to privilege key stra-
tegic actors like Globo and Clarín.
Kirchner took on the presidency in the aftermath of the  mass protest
mobilisations and political representation crisis. Due to Menem’s defection
from the runoff, Kirchner eventually won the presidency with only  per
cent of the vote. The newly elected president tackled his first challenge, to re-
construct political authority, by promising a ‘renewal of politics’ aimed at
building support among the sceptical urban middle classes. In this context,
his relationship with the public, the media and especially the Clarín Group
assumed strategic importance for his political future. As discussed below,
Kirchner shared and overstated the ‘common sense’ of political leaders regard-
ing Clarín’s role in governability. Kirchner cared about Clarín not only
because of its perceived power but also because he believed that its outlets’
audiences overlapped with his own potential constituency.
In  Lula competed for the presidency for the fourth time. A long de-
radicalisation process had made his  leftist platform seem far away. While
he had once denounced the media as part of the establishment, Lula’s profes-
sionalised campaign hired marketing gurus to communicate a moderate
message. To appease the establishment, Lula’s inner circle decided to signal
continuity with the macro-economic orthodoxy in a ‘Letter to the Brazilian
People’. To ensure a victory in the runoff, the PT allied with non-leftist
parties and leaders who were, in turn, allies of the Globo network.
Predictably, demands for media democratisation, part of the historical
agenda of the PT and its civil society allies, disappeared from the electoral pro-
gramme. Shortly before the election Lula held private meetings with the
Marinho family. The night he was elected he appeared on a popular Sunday
show broadcast by TV Globo. The next day he sat beside the JN anchor
during the entire newscast, commenting on the elections.
For their part, the media conglomerates also had incentives for seeking ac-
commodation at the outset of Lula’s and Kirchner’s presidencies. In the
context of the s inflation control policies, which pegged the respective
local currencies to the US dollar, both groups made investments and
thereby amassed significant debt in US dollars. When currency devaluations
 Levitsky and Roberts, The Resurgence of the Left, p. .
 Philip Kitzberger, ‘“La madre de todas las batallas”: el kirchnerismo y los medios de
comunicación’, in Andrés Malamud and Miguel De Luca (eds.), La política en tiempos de
los Kirchner (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, ), pp. –.
 Sivak, Clarín, p. .
 Ricardo Kotscho, Do golpe ao Planalto: uma vida de repórter (São Paulo: Companhia das
Letras, ), pp. –; Porto, Media Power, p. .
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and market contraction resulting from the  crisis occurred in  in
Brazil and in  in Argentina the two conglomerates were left in a vulner-
able position. In , Globo’s debt amounted to US$  billion. By ,
Clarín faced the possibility of being taken over by its creditors.
Even before Lula and Kirchner took office they signalled goodwill regarding
the groups’ problems. In mid-, prior to the upcoming elections, the PT
supported a constitutional amendment that would allow up to  per cent
foreign capital in communications enterprises. During its first days, Lula’s gov-
ernment showed a willingness to extend credits to Globo through the National
Development Bank.
During Duhalde’s interim government just prior to Kirchner’s first term,
and after intense lobbying by Clarín, Congress had approved a law establishing
a cap on foreign ownership of ‘cultural industries’, thereby preventing the
group’s holders from losing control of their assets to foreign creditors. This
initiative, dubbed by critics the ‘Clarín Law’, was sanctioned by the executive
a few days after Kirchner took office.
It is plausible that Clarín’s financial weakness reinforced the conglomerate’s
initial benevolence towards the Kirchner administration. Observers also con-
sider it to be an example of a broader pattern wherein Clarín agrees with gov-
ernments in their initial phase, only to become a tenacious critic once it has
achieved its goals.
Certainly, these considerations do not exhaust the reasons for the initial
benevolence. For Globo, as for any media institution, opposing Lula’s rising
popularity would have been costly. Kirchner, meanwhile, took office as an
unknown figure. His popularity only increased later. Given the context of pol-
itical and economic instability in Argentina, however, Clarín’s CEO and the
conglomerate’s journalistic leadership stood behind the initial government
decisions, which were seen as conducive to national recovery.
The initial coverage reflected these incentives. Globo seemed to celebrate
the election of the political leader it had traditionally opposed. In fact, in con-
trast to the paulista print media, which was critical from the outset, the group’s
‘[network] news coverage of Lula’s first months in office was characterised by a
very positive tone’. Clarín, for its part, praised the main policies, exalted the
 Fearing the negative repercussions of accepting state help, Globo finally opted for a privately
negotiated debt restructuring. Carlos E. Lins da Silva, ‘Television in Brazil’, in David Ward
(ed.), Television and Public Policy: Change and Continuity in the Era of Global Liberalization
(New York: Taylor & Francis, ), pp. –.
 Martín Becerra and Sebastián Lacunza, Wikimedialeaks. La relación entre medios y gobiernos
de América Latina bajo el prisma de los cables de Wikileaks (Buenos Aires: Ediciones B, ),
p. .
 Sivak, Clarín, p. .
 Porto, Media Power, p. ; Antonio Rubim and Leandro Colling, ‘Política, cultura e a
cobertura jornalística das eleições presidenciais de ’, in Jefferson Goulart (ed.), Mídia
e democracia (São Paulo: Annablume, ), pp. –.
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president’s virtues and took a mostly gentle tone during Kirchner’s first three
years in office.
Both administrations reciprocated. During his presidency, Kirchner
invested in a personal relationship with Magnetto. He also appointed an
officer sympathetic to sectoral requests to the broadcasting regulatory author-
ity. Clarín was favoured by several decisions. In , the main national broad-
casters had their licences renewed for ten years. In , a decree granted an
additional ten-year grace period for all television licensees. Three days before
handing over the presidency to his wife, Kirchner approved the merger of
the country’s two leading cable providers, granting Clarín a dominant position
in cable TV and internet provision markets, a sector that, by , represented
 per cent of the conglomerate’s revenues. Additionally, Clarín retained a
significant share of the official advertising; it benefited from the blocking of
new cable distribution permit requests while its journalistic outlets obtained
privileged access to and scoops from government sources. Until ,
Kirchner tried to favour the group’s expansion ambitions regarding the tele-
communications sector. Simultaneously, however, he also sought to counter-
balance the group’s dominant position by trying to tempt foreign business
organisations, Telmex and Prisa, to enter the Argentine media sector and by
strengthening other local entrepreneurs.
While Kirchner was pragmatic at the level of owners and editors, his rapport
with the press was tense from the outset. Apart from choosing the conservative
La Nación as an ideological opponent right from the beginning, Kirchner
tended to present journalism as dependent on non-elected powers and intellec-
tually subordinate to neoliberal-technocratic common sense. The executive
viewed itself as leading the recovery of politics’ autonomy in the face of the
media’s fake neutrality. This viewpoint, sporadically present in discourse
from  on, would become commonplace after . At the level of govern-
mental communications practices, Kirchner routinely resorted to controlled
events, exerted strict vertical control over sources, and avoided conventional
interactions such as interviews and press conferences. These tactics contributed
to tension with journalists.
The early accommodation impulses of Lula’s administration can also be
detected in a series of government decisions and non-decisions in addition
to the above-mentioned privileges accorded to TV Globo. The PT had histor-
ically been aligned with media democratisation agendas, and the civil society
organisations that had come together during the s in the Fórum
Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação (National Forum for the
 Sivak, Clarín, p. .
 Graciela Mochkofsky, Pecado original. Clarín, los Kirchner y la lucha por el poder (Buenos
Aires: Planeta, ), pp. –; Sivak, Clarín, pp. –.
 Kitzberger, Media Activism, pp. –.
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Democratisation of communications, FNDC) were organically linked to the
party, with overlapping memberships. While these democratisation demands
had been silenced during the  campaign, there was uncertainty about
what would happen afterwards. This contrasts with Argentina’s experience.
As shown below, the Brazilian government’s initial strategy of accommodating
Globo also entailed containing or deflecting pressures from inside the party
and from its core allies.
With Lula in office, the party’s radical factions and other leftist allies in
Congress renewed their enthusiasm for media democratisation. As Table 
shows, the number of legislative initiatives to regulate broadcasting jumped
abruptly in . This activism was not, however, echoed in Planalto Palace.
The key agency appointments made the accommodation impulses and con-
tainment strategies within the government even more apparent. The Ministry
of Communications (MINCOM) had historically been ceded by the execu-
tives to close allies of the big broadcasters. In , despite initial expectations,
the MINCOM did not go to the PT. Miro Teixeira, Lula’s initial choice, was
an ambiguous one. While his party was heir to Varguista trabahlismo, he repre-
sented a pragmatic position and cultivated good relations with the Marinhos
and other big broadcasters. Despite his appointment of some FNDC cadres in
lower tiers, no significant threat to Globo emerged from Teixeira’s tenure.
However, in the context of the transition to digital television, a decree sanc-
tioned under Teixeira stimulated the creation of a Brazilian standard and
created an advisory board that included representatives from civil society,
thus creating some institutional space for voices that viewed this transition
as an opportunity to subordinate commercial interests to civic-political
goals. This initiative represented a challenge to Globo’s interests, which, in as-
sociation with the electronic equipment supplier NEC do Brasil, had invested
in adopting the Japanese standard. By January , Teixeira had been
replaced by a politician from the conservative Partido do Movimento
Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement,
PMDB), yet the progressive groups committed to developing the Brazilian
norm kept working autonomously. With the outbreak of the Mensalão,
Lula was forced to redistribute cabinet posts. As part of this reshuffle, Hélio
Costa, another conservative PMDB member and himself a former TV
Globo correspondent and media entrepreneur, was designated head of
MINCOM in July . As many observers agree, his main agenda was to
guide the digital transition in Globo’s interest. In , the Japanese–
Brazilian standard was adopted by decree.
 Interviews with Marcos Dantas, former Planning Secretary, MINCOM,  July ;
Gustavo Gindre, FNDC member,  July ; James Görgen, Advisor to the Executive
Secretary, MINCOM,  June .
 Becerra and Lacunza, Wikimedialeaks, p. .
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These pragmatic moves towards Globo coexisted with tensions between
government and press institutions. After a brief honeymoon, aggressive press
coverage revived old petista critical views of the media and divided Lula’s
inner circle over the attitude to be assumed. Although torn himself, Lula’s pru-
dential avoidance of confrontation mostly prevailed. Additionally, a trend
that would fully emerge after the / crises was already visible: Lula em-
bodied the man of the povo (common people) who had reached the top pol-
itical position, previously the exclusive domain of social elites. This brought
latent class prejudice in reporting to the fore, while his direct-communication
appeals were denounced as ‘populist’. Journalists were further alienated by the
adoption of the governmental communications practices including regular
presidential broadcasts (‘Café com o Presidente’), refusal of journalistic con-
ventions, and staged events used as agenda-setting devices.
Amidst this initial tension, two brief but disruptive episodes would have im-
portant consequences. Both were sparked by allies’ initiatives, not by the ex-
ecutive itself. First, in the aftermath of the scandal around a New York
Times column that claimed Lula had a drinking problem, the journalists’
union promoted the creation of a Federal Journalism Council, a non-govern-
mental body intended to set ethical standards and regulate professional
conduct. Second, a group of progressive filmmakers working at the Ministry
of Culture proposed the creation of a National Agency for Cinema and
Audio-visual Activities with regulatory authority over the audio-visual
sector, including television. Both initiatives triggered fierce media reactions,
with the projects presented as threats to press freedom and expressions of
the government’s authoritarian-statism. These reactions led government to
rapidly shelve both proposals. While the first initiative reached the legislative
proposal stage, the second was leaked to the press as a first draft.
Political crisis and media coverage
In both cases, it was a political crisis that disrupted the equilibrium. In Brazil
the crisis was initiated by a corruption scandal, while in Argentina it was trig-
gered by an agrarian conflict. The coverage of these episodes by Globo’s and
Clarín’s news outlets, aligned to most of the mainstream media, signalled a
shift. In both cases, the government and their closest allies interpreted this
change as an unmistakable sign of political activism by the media elites, ultim-
ately aimed at ousting them from the presidency.
The fragile harmony between the government and Clarín began to come
under strain during the last year of Kirchner’s presidency. Divergences over
policy and business interests increased mutual distrust and were reflected in
 See Lula’s press secretary’s memoirs, Kotscho, Do golpe ao Planalto, pp. –.
 Kitzberger, Media Activism, pp. –.
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news coverage. But the turning point came a few months after Cristina
Fernández’s appointment, in the context of the agrarian conflict that occurred
between March and June . After the government passed a resolution that
adjusted export taxes for agricultural products to fluctuations in world market
prices, farmers launched a lockout with massive roadblocks, thereby paralysing
the country.
As the agrarian conflict unfolded and farmers progressively gained support
from significant segments of the urban middle classes, the Kirchners blamed
the growing hostility towards the government on Clarín’s coverage of
events. The Clarín outlets’ framing of the protest as a ‘historical strike’ and
the extensive live coverage of the protesters convinced the government that
Clarín was taking sides with those who wanted to oust the president, a persua-
sion it started to voice publicly.
The government was not alone in harbouring this perception. A wider
segment of society, especially middle-class progressives, started to criticise the
biases of Clarín and the other mainstream media organisations. These voices
constituted the support base for the Kirchners’ nascent counter-hegemonic
media policy. One central aspect of the coverage that mobilised these voices
was the prevalence of a binary narrative based on class and race stereotypes.
The media presented the anti-government protests as legitimate spontaneous
actions by honest, productive, autonomous white citizens in opposition to the
spurious political-machine-based mobilisation of poor, non-white clienteles.
Yet the framing contest was a difficult challenge for the government. To
counter the frame that opposed a freely mobilised people to a clientelist
machine, the government utilised the classic populist divide between the
people (pueblo) and the powerful minorities (oligarquías). Eventually,
though, the opposition became so massive that the government lost the
Senate vote over the export tax resolution in June . This outcome
would contribute decisively to the subsequent dynamic.
From June  until the  elections, a series of scandals shook Brazilian
politics. The Mensalão scandal began with revelations by a federal deputy of a
scheme consisting of monthly allowances to congressmen in return for their
support for government legislation. The scheme involved PT leaders and
top government officials. This was followed by the Sanguessugas scandal,
which uncovered paybacks to legislators (from both the government coalition
 Cristof Mauersberger, ‘To be Prepared when the Time has Come: Argentina’s new Media
Regulation and the Social Movement for Democratizing Broadcasting’, Media, Culture and
Society, :  (), pp. –; Sivak, Clarín, pp. –.
 Sivak, Clarín, p. .
 Gabriel Vommaro, ‘“Acá el choripán se paga”: movilización política y grupos sociales en el
reciente conflicto en torno a las retenciones a las exportaciones de grano’, in Ricardo
Aronskind and G. Vommaro (eds.), Campos de batalla. Las rutas, los medios y las plazas en
el nuevo conflicto agrario (Buenos Aires: Prometeo-UNGS, ), pp. –.
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and the opposition) for the approval of budget amendments for the acquisition
of ambulances. On the eve of the presidential election, the police detained two
members of the PT with a large sum of money in a hotel. They were supposedly
buying photographs that proved the involvement of Partido da Social
Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party, PSDB) oppositional
leaders in the aforementioned ambulance purchases. The media’s use of the
images of the arrest triggered the so-called ‘dossier scandal’. While Lula was
ultimately re-elected in a runoff, the exposés had a high political cost: many
of the president’s close advisors had to resign, and the PT’s image was severely
tarnished.
With the outbreak of the Mensalão, TV Globo abandoned its previously
benevolent attitude and joined the main newspapers in their increased hostility
towards both the president and his party. Corruption became the almost ex-
clusive topic of political coverage. As different observers noticed, a denunci-
ation frenzy (denuncismo) possessed journalists, frequently at the expense of
professionalism. Moral categories dominated the frames used in political
reporting, and other relevant dimensions of politics and policy processes
were omitted and distorted.
These tendencies intensified as the  elections approached. According to
Porto, while TV Globo maintained relatively balanced airtime, ‘Lula’s cover-
age was predominantly negative and focused heavily on denunciations against
him and his party’. JN devoted unprecedented attention to the elections, two-
thirds of its airtime in the final two weeks. Most of the coverage ‘dealt with the
dossier scandal that came to light in the last two weeks of the first round’. Two
days before the first round, JN repeatedly broadcast pictures of the confiscated
money, thus amplifying the scandal. Subsequent research has suggested that
this media frenzy had an impact on voting behaviour and prevented Lula
from winning the first round.
As a result of the reporting on these scandals, the perception of a media bias
against the PT government, deliberate or not, aimed at interrupting its
mandate or at least impeding its re-election, gained ground among government
officials, party members, leftist militants, progressive intellectuals, journalists
and sectors of civil society. At the peak of the crisis and with impeachment
a pending possibility, Lula mobilised support from among his social base. In
June , over  organisations published a statement in which they
accused the elites and the mass media of ‘launching a campaign to demoralise
 Venício Lima, A mídia nas eleições de  (São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, );
Lima, Crise política.
 Porto, Media Power, pp. –; Lima, A mídia nas eleições de .
 Lima, A mídia nas eleições de . Most interviewees agreed on the existence of this
perception.
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both the government and the president in order to undermine his administra-
tion or to overthrow him’.
The overt bias also drew criticism from scholars, journalists, activists and
media observers. Media behaviour became a matter of debate. The –
crisis coverage seemed to many to be a regression to Globo’s manipulative
practices of . Others criticised coordinated behaviour to control the
public agenda on the part of ‘big media’, taken to include Globo, Editora
Abril, Folha Group and Estado Group. Besides corporate interests, critics
detected ideological and class factors as also being behind antilulismo and anti-
petismo. A documentary comparing Marinho to Citizen Kane was widely cir-
culated in leftist circles. Militants frequently referred to the golpe midiático of
April  in Venezuela as an antecedent. Others pointed to lacerdismo and
the role of the press in the  coup. The expression ‘PIG’ (Partido da
Imprensa Golpista) became widely used among critical journalists and leftist
bloggers.
The airtime devoted by JN to the photos of the dossier scandal generated
special controversy. The government-leaning newsweekly Carta Capital
claimed that the photos had been leaked deliberately to damage Lula’s candi-
dacy. It accused TV Globo and several newspapers of actively plotting against
Lula by omitting important facts about the leak itself and by failing to report
the involvement of PSDB politicians in the scandal. This context resulted in
resignations, firings and protests by journalists and media professionals
working for TV Globo and for other media.
The case of Franklin Martins, a former guerrilla fighter in the s and
now appointed columnist for JN, would have a major impact on subsequent
developments. In May , Globo cancelled his contract, alleging reasons
based on ‘audience research’. Martins attributed his dismissal to his ‘refusal
to join the news media’s tendency to present facile denunciations that lack
sufficient evidence’. Martins’ ‘commentaries were usually more cautious
about the allegations involving the president, when compared to the general
tone of the news media’ and, according to him, ‘TV Globo’s executives and
editors grew increasingly uncomfortable’ with it.
Divergent Paths
Despite the striking similarities in the initial settings and subsequent develop-
ment of the relationships between governments and the dominant media
 Gómez Bruera, Lula, the Workers Party and Governability, p. .
 See Lima, A mídia nas eleições de .
 Porto, Media Power, pp. –; Lima, A mídia nas eleições de , pp. –, appendix.
 Franklin Martins, ‘A era da pedra no lago acabou’, Caros Amigos, , September . Porto,
Media Power, p. .
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actors, the critical junctures of – and  drew divergent responses
from the Lula and the Kirchnerist administrations. However, the differences
in the strategies deployed by both governments should not obscure a common-
ality: both responses signalled a departure from what Gómez Bruera calls ‘elite-
centred strategies’. In other words, they shared the underlying diagnosis that
relying exclusively on accommodating strategic actors and accepting given
power relations in the media sphere was no longer a viable, or, at least, reason-
able, strategy. This insight opened up some space or opportunities for reformist
agendas that had previously been ignored.
The Kirchnerist response
From the end of March , a few weeks after the agrarian lockout had begun,
the steady escalation between the Argentine government and the ‘dominant
media’ (mainly Clarín) developed into all-out confrontation. This ‘mother of
all battles’ was fought on every front. The government deployed all its political
resources, with the ultimate aim of radically altering power relations in the media
sphere, in other words, of crushing Clarín’s dominant position.
In April , beginning with the replacement of the head of the broadcast-
ing regulatory agency, the Kirchners approached civil society sectors committed
to achieving legal reforms to democratise the media. After a long process, this
alliance concluded with the sanctioning in October  of a comprehensive
media law, the Ley de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual (Audio-visual
Communication Services Law, LSCA). The legislation mainly addressed plural-
ity and diversity through structural regulations aimed at reversing media owner-
ship and audience concentration via bans on cross-ownership, limits on
broadcasting licence numbers, and subscriber caps for pay-TV services, among
other policy mechanisms. Under such rules the Clarín Group and other organi-
sations, albeit to a lesser degree, would be forced to divest a number of assets.
The agrarian conflict also triggered the Kirchners’ going public with a dis-
course that defined the ‘dominant media’ as the real and unelected opposition.
This depiction of the media gradually developed into a cultural war, fought on
screens, papers and in new media; and an expanding circle of allies popularised
academic, media-critical discourses that deconstructed the ideological, corpor-
ate and journalistic biases in dominant media narratives on a daily basis. These
Gramscian tactics were central to mobilising support during the legislative
debate on the LSCA.
 Gómez Bruera, Lula, the Workers Party and Governability, p. .
 Clarín resisted the law’s enforcement by filing judicial complaints. In October , the
Supreme Court dismissed Clarín’s claims about the law’s unconstitutionality.
 Mauersberger, To be Prepared; Kitzberger, La madre de todas las batallas; Beatriz Sarlo, La
audacia y el cálculo. Kirchner – (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, ).
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Simultaneously, myriad political, judicial and administrative measures were
undertaken to undermine Clarín’s interests and credibility. The public ques-
tioning of Clarín’s role during the dictatorship, especially the alleged appropri-
ation by Noble’s widow of children of the desaparecidos and the acquisition,
together with La Nación, of shares in the newsprint factory Papel Prensa, sup-
posedly through extortion and in complicity with the military, led to the risk
of criminal prosecution for Clarín’s and La Nación’s owners. In , the
government bought the transmission rights for first-division soccer from the
national football association to broadcast games on free-to-air television. In
doing so, the government overturned the long-standing, exclusive possession,
since , of these rights by a pay-per-view channel co-owned by Clarín, a
key resource in the expansion of the group’s business operations.
Additionally, the government unblocked the distribution of cable licences,
decided to adopt the Japanese–Brazilian standard for digital television
(although Clarín had an interest in the US standard), reduced official adver-
tising in Clarín’s outlets, and fuelled new pro-government media.
The Lula government’s response
The Brazilian government’s response to the media hostility unleashed by the
Mensalão contrasts with the Kirchnerist confrontation strategy. However, its
approach cannot be accurately described as continued accommodation. In his
second term Lula in fact exhibited a hybrid strategy, with elements of both ac-
commodation and defiance.
Lula’s government did not embark on legislative reforms of media regula-
tion. Nor did it challenge the broadcasting status quo by appointing uncom-
fortable figures linked to reformist agendas to head regulatory authorities.
Hélio Costa, mentioned above, remained communications minister for the
whole of Lula’s second term.
Nevertheless, significant changes gradually became visible. Despite his avoid-
ance of all-out public confrontation, Lula’s critiques of media bias and distor-
tion became more audible and were increasingly framed in terms of ‘them’
against ‘us’ so as to emphasise the Brazilian media’s elitism. The government
ended TV Globo’s privileged relationship, increased its own use of direct-
communication devices, and increasingly circumvented journalists. In add-
ition, during Lula’s second term new spaces opened up inside the state appar-
atus where certain reforms were promoted and civil society was mobilised
around establishing a communications reform agenda by the end of the
presidency.
 Mochkofsky, Pecado original. Sivak, Clarín, pp. –.
 See Lula’s interview with Piauí magazine, December , available at www.info.planalto.
gov.br/exec/inf_entrevistasdata.cfm (accessed  April ).
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In March , Lula appointed Franklin Martins, the fired JN columnist, as
head of the Presidential Secretariat for Social Communication, thus sending
an unmistakable signal that the government was distancing itself from
Globo. From the Secretariat, Martins deepened the redirection of government
advertising away from traditional to alternative and regional media outlets.
Authorised by the president, he also went beyond the Secretariat’s established
tasks and intruded on some of MINCOM’s responsibilities. In , in a
move driven by Martins and justified with the need to counter-balance
market-based logic and promote debates that commercial television was not
interested in, the government created a national public media system that
united existing public radio stations and created a national public television
station.
This promotion of debates and institutional opening remobilised civil
society, which in turn helped invigorate human rights and civic-oriented pol-
icies in the media realm. This feedback effect was clearly visible in the long
struggle to regulate children’s rights regarding television through the establish-
ment of broadcasting hours regulations and a content rating system for chil-
dren, which, given Brazil’s multiple time zones, affected the scale economies
of national broadcasters. These initiatives had existed since Fernando
Henrique Cardoso’s presidency. However, until , big media had success-
fully vetoed each regulatory attempt through PR campaigns and judicial action.
In the new context, however, the government finally succeeded in upholding a
Ministry of Justice decree imposing certain obligations such as programme
classification rules and children’s viewing hours over unfettered profit
maximisation.
The climax of this government-sponsored remobilisation of civil society was
reached in  at the World Social Forum, when Lula announced a Federal
Communication Conference (CONFECOM). This national public policy
conference, a participatory constitutional mechanism, entailed extensive mo-
bilisation at the municipal, state and federal levels. In December , over
, elected national delegates voted on over  proposals that, according
to Lula, would constitute the input to a future regulatory law. The partici-
pants, who were demonised or ignored by big media, were not limited to
NGOs or social movements. While the Brazilian Broadcasters Association
(ABERT), dominated by Globo, and the National Newspaper Association
(ANJ), representing the big newspapers, retired from the debates, other busi-
ness organisations representing telecommunications companies and dissident
broadcasters remained. Lula’s ability to manage intra-business conflicts of
interest undermined Globo’s capacity to keep regulatory debates behind
closed doors. By the end of his second term Lula had established an unprece-
dented level of public debate on the need for democratic media regulations in
Brazil. This new climate, as Table  has shown, sparked a new peak of
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legislative activism between  and . Six months before handing over
power to Dilma Rousseff, Lula created a commission, led by Martins, intended
to generate proposals for a new regulatory framework for broadcasting.
As a former FNDC member put it to me, the governmental strategy since
Lula’s second term has not consisted of open confrontation but rather of
‘eating from the borders’: Lula expanded state activity in those areas with
less resistance, enabled critical voices in civil society, promoted some public
debate on the need for media regulation, and isolated the traditional media.
Explaining variations in strategy
This section explores first the opportunities and constraints in the institution-
al, media and social arenas affecting the perceived viability of different strategic
choices. Second, it addresses strategic shifts focusing on dynamic processes that
affected governmental beliefs.
An examination of the correlation of forces in Congress shows why legal
reform was never an option during Lula’s presidencies. Brazil’s institutional
design imposes severe political constraints on governments. Its combination
of presidentialism, federalism and proportionality in the national legislature
has strong fragmenting effects on party representation, forcing strategies of
‘coalition presidentialism’. As a vast literature attests, to achieve political gov-
ernability, presidents need to distribute resources and jobs, especially cabinet
posts, so as to form broad, pragmatic legislative coalitions. The PT government
was no exception to the rule. In fact, the Mensalão was a consequence of the
executive’s initial difficulty coping with coalition building. In , the PT,
the biggest legislative bloc, obtained  of  (. per cent) seats in the
lower chamber. In the Senate it was third in size, with only  out of 
seats (. per cent). Adding leftist allied parties, the bloc reached an estimate
of  per cent of lower chamber seats. Damaged by the scandals, the PT was in
an even weaker position after the  elections. In the lower chamber it
secured only  seats, while in the Senate it formed the fourth-largest bloc
with  members. From a comparative perspective, ‘the PT had the lowest
number of congressional representatives of any other progressive party in gov-
ernment in Latin America at the time’. As a consequence, during Lula’s
presidencies the PT-led government included between eight and  parties,
many of them ideologically heterogeneous, in its legislative coalitions.
This feature, a barrier to reformist agendas in general, looked even worse in
the realm of media regulation given the linkages between political elites and
media powers. These links had begun to take shape under President José
Sarney (–). After appointing Antônio Carlos Magalhães, a
 Lima, Por que não se avança nas comunicações.
 Gómez Bruera, Lula, the Workers Party and Governability, p. .
Media Wars and the New Left
conservative politician and close friend to Marinho, as communications min-
ister, Sarney distributed , broadcasting licences as a way to obtain support,
especially on the eve of the  constituent assembly, at which time  leg-
islators obtained licences. Known as coronelismo eletrônico (‘electronic clien-
telism’), a new structure that articulated state oligarchies and media empires
was consolidated. Sarney and Magalhães best exemplified this structure as
they built media groups in their respective states of Maranhão and Bahia
that, by becoming Rede Globo affiliates, secured audience domination. In
the s, the most important stations in  of  federal states functioned
as Globo affiliates and all were owned by local oligarchs.
Since , licence concessions require a legislative decree besides executive
approval. Consequently, the  constitution banned legislators from
holding broadcasting licenses. Nonetheless, a significant number of legislators
still directly or indirectly own broadcasting stations. In ,  federal dep-
uties held such licences. In ,  senators were identified as direct owners.
Observers consider a so-called ‘bancada da mídia’ (media bloc) to exist, which
is estimated to total about  per cent of congressmen.
These entanglements have also been evident in the Science, Technology,
Communications and Informatics Committee (CCTCI) of the lower
chamber. In ,  of its  members (including the president) held 
licences. In ,  of  members held . In , five out of  senators
in the upper chamber’s equivalent committee were licensees. Most of these leg-
islators regularly voted on licence requests and renewals, sometimes even in
cases concerning themselves.
PT legislators and their leftist allies did not participate in electronic clien-
telism. However, it is common practice among the PT’s non-leftist congres-
sional allies. In the asset declarations registered in ,  of  deputies
(. per cent) admitted to holding licences. Of the  representatives
from the three biggest allied parties (PMDB, Partido da República, Partido
Democrático Trabalhista), ( per cent) are licensees, a figure greater
than the chamber average.
The correlation of legislative forces looked very different in Argentina under
Kirchnerism than it did in Brazil. In the  elections the government’s
Frente para la Victoria obtained  seats out of  in the chamber of dep-
uties. After the agrarian conflict, many legislators deserted and the government
 Later, Cardoso also used licences to bargain a constitutional amendment to allow presidential
re-election.
 Lima, Crise política. Porto, Media Power, pp. –.
 Interviews with Suzy dos Santos, Academic UFRJ,  July ; Emiliano José, Federal
Deputy PT-BA,  June .
 Lima, Crise política. Transparência Brasil, Como são nossos parlamentares (São Paulo:
Transparência Brasil, ).
 http://www.transparencia.org.br/ (accessed on  September ).
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bloc decreased to about  seats. However, the media law’s reformist nature,
its recognition by international organisations’ freedom of expression rappor-
teurs, and some concessions for amendments helped the legislative coalition
expand to include opposition parties, mostly from the Left. The law obtained
 votes, with  of them from the official bloc and  from opposition
representatives. In the Peronist Party-dominated Senate, the bill passed with
 affirmative versus  negative votes. These disciplined majorities were
also eased by the fact that the government pushed the bill immediately after
the mid-term elections, further reducing the media’s capacity to pressure
legislators.
In Argentina, local politicians frequently control local media. However,
these outlets are not linked to big media as in Brazil’s affiliate system.
Therefore, Argentina has no equivalent trend to Brazilian coronelismo
eletrônico. Moreover, because Congress has no jurisdiction over broadcasting
concessions, which remain an executive prerogative, nothing comparable to
the ‘bancada da mídia’ has developed.
Media organisations’ impact on political careers should also be considered a
congressional constraint. Brazilian federal representatives are elected via an
open-list proportional representation system that prompts voters to choose in-
dividual candidates based on personal qualities and activities. This makes
media access, alongside pork-barrelling, a central campaign resource. In con-
trast, Argentina’s closed blocked-list electoral system increases the role of
parties and discipline over individualism, distancing career success from
media performance. This makes Argentine legislators less sensitive to media
interests.
Moreover, in Argentina, the broadcasting sector lacks strong interest groups
capable of successful lobbying, as a consequence of the fact that broadcast tele-
vision was under state control between  and . In sharp contrast,
ABERT, the Brazilian sectoral organisation representing commercial broadcas-
ters was born in , when it successfully repealed most of João Goulart’s
presidential vetoes to a telecommunications regulatory bill and initiated a
long tradition of legislative lobbying against reformist attempts.
 Javier Zelaznik, ‘Las coaliciones kirchneristas’, in Malamud and De Luca, Política en tiempos
de Kirchner, pp. –.
 Barry Ames. ‘Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation’, American
Journal of Political Science, :  (), pp. –.
 For an analysis of the way electoral systems affect the influence of established media interests
on legislators, see Hernán Galperin, New TV, Old Politics: The Transition to Digital TV in
the US and Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
 Hernán Galperin, ‘Regulatory Reform in the Broadcasting Industries of Brazil and Argentina
in the s’, Journal of Communication, :  (), pp. –.
 See their self-presentation in ABERT, Relatório de gestão. Bienios /, /
(Brasília: ABERT, ).
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Still, the constraining power of media organisations is not predominantly
reliant on their capacity to lobby through formal institutions. As already sug-
gested, media power is a function of its reputation among political elites for
being capable of affecting careers and governability. Surveys show that all
over Latin America political elites increasingly perceive media actors as
leading ‘de facto powers’ (poderes fácticos). The differences in the intensity
of these perceptions between Argentina and Brazil are difficult to assess. One
proxy could be general media credibility, assuming that credibility at least par-
tially influences public opinion. Survey data reveals persistently higher media
credibility in Brazil. In a  poll by Latinobarómetro, . per cent of
Brazilian respondents expressed ‘satisfaction with media objectivity’ while
only . per cent of Argentines did so. LAPOP data from  assessed
media confidence on a – scale. While Brazil obtained . points,
Argentina only received .. This suggests that higher media credibility
could correlate with accommodation strategies, because confrontation is per-
ceived as having a higher cost.
Media power might, in turn, depend on market concentration and journal-
istic field dominance, since these increase owners’ capacity for state capture
through such coordinated actions as media shutdowns or reputational
damage campaigns to would-be reformers. It is difficult to assess dominance
differentials for the respective cases of Clarín and Globo. As demonstrated
above, both enjoy dominant positions in their respective contexts and have
used their leverage to maintain or expand their positions.
The existence of widespread beliefs, anecdotes and myths shared especially
among elites attest to their reputation. Concerning Globo, Porto reports the
following statement attributed to president-elect Tancredo Neves: ‘I can
fight with the Pope, with the Catholic Church, with PMDB, with anyone,
but I will not fight with Doctor [sic] Roberto [Marinho]’. Anecdotes that
serve as examples of shutdowns and media lynchings circulate in Brazil. One
example is the case of Saturnino Braga, chair of the Parliamentary
Investigative Committee in charge of investigating illegal partnerships
between Globo and Time Life in the s. Another is Orlando Fantazzini,
a PT representative who started a campaign against violence and lowbrow tele-
vision programmes. While the former was excluded from coverage by any of
Globo’s outlets, the latter suffered a smear campaign.
In Clarín’s case, phrases such as ‘no government resists more than five nega-
tive Clarín front pages’ represent a sort of ‘common sense’. As a member of
 Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, La democracia en América Latina (Buenos
Aires: PNUD, ).
 Porto, Media Power, p. .
 Interviews José Gindre.
 Sivak, Clarín; Mochkofsky, Pecado original.
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the Kirchners’ inner circle stated, ‘Like every democratic president before him,
Kirchner believed that treating Clarín well would guarantee reciprocal good
treatment. He saw in Clarín much more than a newspaper, a TV station, a
cable provider, a radio, etc.; he considered it one of the greatest power
factors in Argentina, an “absolutely assembled system of news control”.’
This quotation points to possible differences with Brazil. In Argentina, the
memories of the  political collapse may have heightened the perception
of the media’s impact on government stability. This overstated perception
informed Kirchner’s communication style. During the  mid-term cam-
paign he declared that governments that do not exercise a ‘permanent cam-
paign … are taken away with the helicopter’. He was referring to the
image of De la Rúa’s fall. According to Sivak, every government since redemo-
cratisation had been interested in influencing the headlines, especially Clarín’s.
The novelty of Kirchnerismo lay in its daily, obsessive effort to ‘influence,
debate and even dispute the headlines’.
On the opposite side, the relationships to potential allies for confrontation
contrast sharply. As stated, the PT had been historically aligned with media
democratisation agendas and possessed organic links and overlapping member-
ships with the media reform movement. While these social allies were some-
what disappointed with Lula’s moderation strategy of , the PT did not
alienate them after it had come to power. As with social allies in general,
the PT government counted on different appeasement resources to avoid dis-
affection. For media democratisation activists, some material rewards existed
but were somewhat irrelevant, consisting mainly of certain second-tier minis-
terial appointments and the increased distribution of state advertising to alter-
native media. Two other resources were far more important: interpersonal
linkages created complicity; mutual understanding and an acceptance of the
logic under which the government had to operate to survive. The president’s
symbolic capital and legitimacy enabled him to ask for ‘patience’, to control
mobilisation, to set the pace, to appease social movements, and to buy time.
Media democratisation activists mostly internalised the existing obstacles con-
stituted by ‘the Brazilian political system’ and the power of the big media to
halt reforms, while many trusted Lula’s gradualism and capacity to seize
opportunities.
The Kirchners’ relationship with social movements looks, in important
ways, like an inverted mirror of the situation in Brazil. The Kirchners, as an
 Mochkofsky, ibid., p. .
 Kitzberger, La madre de todas las batallas, p. .
 Sivak, Clarín, p. .
 Gómez Bruera, Lula, the Workers Party and Governability, pp. –.
 Interview with Valter Sanches, Metalworkers Union Television Network Director,  June
.
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ascending leftist movement with no prior ties to organised popular actors and
without progressive credentials, had opposite incentives. While Lula counted
on prior support, and had assumed government in a context of declining mo-
bilisation, he was not pressed to court movements advocating radical policies.
In contrast, the Kirchners were compelled by their prior isolation and the high
level of social mobilisation upon their arrival to send strong signals to popular
organisations to gain their support.
While important, these static descriptions of different constraints in the in-
stitutional, media and social arenas do not illuminate how governmental strat-
egies were shaped and shifted, in differing directions, after the respective crises.
A different sort of account is thus required to describe how concrete event
sequences were experienced and affected governmental actors’ perceptions of
potential allied support and opponents’ power in an eventual confrontation.
A first sequential narrative focuses on events influencing evaluations of the
likely availability of support in civil society to pursue counter-hegemonic strat-
egies. The early regulatory proposals initiated by close allies of the PT govern-
ment illustrate such experiences. The proposals to create the journalism
council and the draft aimed at audio-visual sector regulation aroused hostile
media reactions and resulted in a strong informal veto. In both cases a
war over meaning broke out. Drawing on pre-existing fears about the PT,
big media unanimously framed the initiatives as a threat to freedom of expres-
sion by outdated statist interventionism. The fierce application of these narra-
tives to the regulatory attempts raised the perceived transaction costs of any
proposal for media regulation. The showdown had a significant demonstration
effect that made it ‘highly unlikely that anything similar [would in future] be
put forward again’. There were two aspects to this demonstration effect. Not
only were the episodes an indication of how the media reacted to regulatory
initiatives, but they also made clear that the same social allies that promoted
such initiatives had only a limited capacity to mobilise, to unite civil society
around them, and to counter hostile portrayals. Indeed, these incidents
exposed the fact that groups that had successfully mobilised around the
FNDC in the early s had faded and fissured after the Cardoso years.
This perception matched wider doubts among Lula’s inner circle members
about the social movements’ ability to sustain counter-hegemonic mobilisa-
tion during his first years in government.
 Sebastián Etchemendy and Candelaria Garay, ‘Argentina: Left Populism in Comparative
Perspective’, in Levitsky and Roberts, The Resurgence of the Left, pp. –.
 According to one of the initiative’s authors, its first draft was intentionally leaked so as to
‘kill’ it.
 Fernando Lattman-Weltman, ‘Media and Policy Analysis in Brazil: The Process of Policy
Production, Reception and Analysis Through the Media’, in J. Vaitsman, J. Mendes
Ribeiro and L. Lobato (eds.), Policy Analysis in Brazil (Bristol: Policy Press, ), p. .
 Gómez Bruera, Lula, the Workers Party and Governability, p. .
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As outlined above, Kirchner did not initially take up the issue of media
democratisation. However in , sensing that the political climate was chan-
ging, formerly separate community radio organisations, media workers unions,
communications scholars and NGOs started forming the Coalition for
Democratic Broadcasting (CRD). Kirchner’s early outreach on human
rights issues was an incentive to frame media reform as a matter of human
rights and democracy, and thus overcome divisions within the coalition.
Additionally, despite disillusionment with governmental concessions to big
media, the CRD attained the support of prestigious human rights organisa-
tions, which the government had also approached. In fact, the leaders of
Madres and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo helped members of the CRD to grad-
ually access government offices. By the end of Kirchner’s term, the coalition’s
leaders had met the president and obtained some vague promises.
Simultaneously, some rather unnoticed government measures regarding legal-
isation and public recognition of non-commercial broadcasters reinforced the
bridges.
As the agrarian conflict erupted, these bridges eased the approach. But the
government promise to sanction a new media law in the midst of the confron-
tation with Clarín aroused a wave of social support that transcended the CRD
activists:
The Kirchners obtained support from intellectuals, personalities from culture, journal-
ism, education, cinema, arts, literature … [who] had perceived the resurgence of a
classist anti-Peronist Argentina during the crisis, and … condemned how certain
media, among them the Clarín Group, had covered the conflict. … The government
had won, additionally, a critical mass, a minority though relevant group, that backed its
discourse against the excessive power of Clarín and agreed to curtail it.
This support was clearly noticed by the government. However, mobilisation
around legal reform was not a linear process. While mobilisation was
intense during the agrarian conflict, a period of retreat followed the govern-
ment’s June  defeat in parliament. Weakened, and facing mid-term elec-
tions, the Kirchners reconsidered their strategy and even contemplated
reaching a settlement with Clarín. These doubts were reflected in the loss
of impetus vis-à-vis legal reform, and consequently generated worry and dis-
comfort among allies. In November , the CRD sent a letter to the presi-
dent reminding her to take on the commitment and seize the opportunity for
media reform, reaffirming their readiness to mobilise and support her efforts.
 Interview with Damián Loreti, CRD member,  July . Néstor Busso and Diego Jaimes
(eds.), La cocina de la ley. El proceso de incidencia en la elaboración de la Ley de Servicios de
Comunicación Audiovisual en Argentina (Buenos Aires: FARCO, ), pp. –.
 Mochkofsky, Pecado original, p. .
 Kirchner met Magnetto at least once after the conflict. Mochkofsky, Pecado original, p. .
 See Busso and Jaimes, La cocina de la ley, appendix.
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While Clarín remained intransigently hostile, the government continued to be
ambivalent until the elections of June . It was only after these elections,
where the government fared badly, that the Kirchners, (re)adopted a confron-
tational strategy, reminded of its potential for mobilisation. Feeling threatened
after the political defeat, radicalisation appeared as a defensive tactic to retain
the social support gained during the agrarian conflict, which would otherwise
dissipate. In fact, the parliamentary media law debate that occurred between
August and October  (re)mobilised massive support through street
rallies, forums, Facebook groups and a successful broadcasting show wherein
public personalities explicitly revealed their alignment.
The media law was the main component of a wider set of initiatives addres-
sing progressive demands that helped consolidate Kirchnerism as a distinct and
highly mobilised political identity. While between  and  the gov-
ernment had lost wider support, the reformist agenda it defensively adopted
led a core of young, middle-class and intellectual sectors, heirs to the  pol-
itical crisis, to identify with Kirchnerism.
Additionally, the mobilisation around the media law in Argentina was
framed as a conflict between democracy and dictatorship, based on the fact
that the existing media regulations stemmed from the widely repudiated au-
thoritarian regime. Clarín’s dealings with the military were, therefore, con-
tinually played up. In contrast, Brazil’s regulatory framework antedated the
– military regime, which was also not unanimously condemned.
Mobilising around Globo’s past record did not, therefore, seem to offer
such clear pay-offs.
A second time-sensitive narrative illuminates relevant variations in the per-
ceived consequences of the media actors’ hostile behaviour for political sur-
vival. As mentioned, the Kirchners shared and overstated a general belief in
Clarín’s strategic importance for governability. The latter’s hostile coverage
during the agrarian conflict convinced them that the group’s CEO had
taken sides with those determined to topple the government. They ascribed
Clarín responsibility for the growing urban support for landowners. This
motivated a first stage of confrontation that coincided with the agrarian
conflict. Yet after their defeat in Congress, the Kirchners doubted the political
viability of confrontation and thus sought to re-approach Clarín. The Clarín
side, however, (wrongfully) interpreted the congressional defeat as a definitive
political defeat and thus ignored the government’s calls, instead engaging in
 Sarlo, La audacia.
 Other initiatives were same-sex marriage and the reversion of the s pension fund
privatisation.
 José Natanson, ¿Por qué los jóvenes están volviendo a la política? De los indignados a La
Cámpora (Buenos Aires: Debate, ).
 Only after the  street protests Globo publicly apologised for having supported the 
coup.
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further discrediting the government so as to accelerate the ‘succession’ and
‘the birth of a post-Kirchnerist order’.
During the  mid-term elections campaign, the Kirchners found them-
selves heavily opposed by Clarín and most of the other mainstream media. The
electoral defeat reinforced their beliefs about media power. Therefore, intransi-
gent media opposition led them to all-out confrontation as the only choice to
ensure political survival. It was only in the post-electoral context that the final
mobilisation required to pass the media law, the reversal of soccer transmission
rights, and some of the other radical measures would take place. The losses in
popularity and the electoral defeat, which the government ascribed to media
hostility, appear, from a wider perspective, to be related to the economic
cycle. In , the Argentine economy was still feeling the effects of the
 financial crisis. From  on, economic recovery revamped the govern-
ment’s popularity beyond its core constituency.
In Brazil, the timing of the political, economic and media cycles was
different. In , when the political crisis first erupted, the country was
expanding and leaving the – economic crisis behind. Social policies,
mainly Bolsa Família, and minimum wages were improving the living condi-
tions of numerous formerly excluded groups, particularly in the Nordeste
region. Meanwhile, the mainstream media, caught up in a moral frenzy,
fuelled and reflected a climate of outrage among the urban middle and
upper classes. While Lula and especially the PT were losing favour among
these strata, undetected support was growing elsewhere. While government
allies initially perceived and contested a media campaign to undermine the ad-
ministration, as the  general elections approached some individuals close
to Lula started sensing that the media frenzy did not reflect the real political
situation. Not by chance, Franklin Martins was, before Lula’s appointment,
the first to make this perception public. In an interview given before the elec-
tions, Martins announced the presence of a new phenomenon for Brazilian
politics:
We had a behaviour pattern from the end of the struggle against the dictatorship: …
the middle class formed an opinion about it and that opinion extended to the periph-
ery. Like a stone in the lake: the stone fell in the middle class, forming concentric waves
in all directions. The middle class was the class of the so-called opinion leaders: you
conquered them and you had solved it all. What did we see with the Mensalão
crisis? The middle class formed the belief that the government was taken by a gang,
by banditry, etc. … It formed that belief, threw the stone in the lake, the waves
began … they hit somewhere, there was a dike, and the waves returned. Where did
they hit? They hit the C class. It is the guys who earn from two to five minimum
wages. … ‘Now that my life improved you want to overthrow this government?’
And so the C class also says what it has to say, that means, now we start having
more than one centre of information and opinion. From now on it is the C class
 Sivak, Clarín, p. .
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that forms opinion. … The process of political majority formation in the country has
become much more complex than five years ago.… The newspapers directed at the A
and B classes have not grown for a long time; those directed at the C class are prolif-
erating all over the country. This indicates that many more people who in principle
have different aspirations, life stories, concerns, habits, tics … are being incorporated
in the market and in citizenship.… In a certain way, Lula’s election meant that these
people are feeling like part of the game.
After the  elections, this perception spread among government members,
allies and PT intellectuals. In a  interview, Lula himself, at the peak of
his popularity, declared his indifference to the historical ideology and behav-
iour of Brazil’s media. The biased nature of the media, he reasoned, had
lost importance since audiences had become ‘intelligent’ and able to discern
for themselves what went beyond fact.
If after the Mensalão the perception gained ground that Globo and other
big media sought to topple Lula, on the eve of the  elections the govern-
ment nucleus learnt that the power of these media was relative. The media
reasserted their elitism and partisanship (as the old PT beliefs held), but
they lost their perceived centrality for political survival. Therefore, it was rea-
soned that even when attacked, the best strategy might be simply to ignore or
circumvent instead of engaging in energy-consuming wars that could not be
won either in Congress or on the screens. To advance media change, it
would be better to make gradual and more subtle moves. The actions taken
during Lula’s second term were consistent with this diagnosis.
Conclusion
In contemporary Latin America the realm of the media has become one of the
central arenas of political struggle. The presence of powerful media conglom-
erates that function as strategic actors following their own corporate and ideo-
logical agendas presents important dilemmas for democratic politics. While the
growing power of media organisations in the region has increased demands for
democratic regulation, their perceived veto capacity and state capture has led
political players to see accommodation as the only viable course of action.
I have focused on the strategic choices vis-à-vis dominant media actors of
two governments that, in addition to experiencing the pressure to accommo-
date big media, held or established some form of commitment regarding media
democratisation demands. Instead of relying on assigned prior political
 Martins, A era da pedra.
 Lula’s second-term press speaker wrote a resonant analysis of Lula’s new social coalition:
André Singer, ‘Raízes sociais e ideológicas do Lulismo’, Novos Estudos,  (), pp. –
; also José Dirceu, ‘Fatos e fotos’, Jornal do Brasil,  Aug.  on the media voters’
disconnection.
 See Lula, Piauí interview.
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traditions or ideological identities (such as the populist or non-populist Left), I
have established the importance of environmental factors and critical junctures
as determinants of governments’ strategic choices.
Drawing on the literature on the impact of institutional factors on policy
preferences, I have found that significant differences in institutional configura-
tions and the political articulation of media interests create contrasting polit-
ical opportunities. In Brazil, the executive’s room for manoeuvre is
comparatively more constrained by the congressional correlation of forces,
the electoral system, the linkages between political and media elites, the fea-
tures of interest group organisation, the overall prestige of media institutions
and the features of civil society. However, I have also shown that such ‘hard’
constraints, while important, do no tell the whole story. In contrast to other
policy areas, the power of the strategic actors in the media sphere is mainly
reputational, emphasising the subjective nature of opportunities and con-
straints that underpin political action. Consequently, I analysed a second
layer of factors based on timing and learning processes. This analysis explored
how certain junctures and sequences of events affected government percep-
tions, which, in turn, decisively informed the two governments’ respective stra-
tegic stances.
This analysis of the perception of political opportunities and constraints in
the realm of media politics contributes to the broader literature on Latin
America’s left turn by investigating variation in policy and elite defiance
within the governments of different countries. I showed how certain learning
processes operate as cognitive mechanisms that shape governments’ assess-
ments of the correlation of forces, the availability of support, and chances of
political survival.
The perceived consequences of the media’s hostile behaviour for political
survival during the respective crises were crucial, but in the cases studied
here, the causal conclusions differed and therefore the governments took op-
posing trajectories in response to media hostility. Government evaluations
of media power and subsequent strategies vis-à-vis dominant media depended
on whether hostile media coverage occurred during phases of economic expan-
sion or economic crisis. Different overlaps decisively influenced governmental
assessments of the media group’s capacity to affect their own political fortunes.
These varying assessments, in turn, crucially influenced subsequent govern-
mental strategies.
In sum, while ideas and pre-held beliefs remain important, I have empha-
sised the centrality of institutional environments and political junctures in
shaping political choices. However, as the Argentine case has made clear,
under certain circumstances the pressing need to stabilise a political identity
can be achieved by going public with ideological beliefs. Certain ideas that res-
onate among possible constituencies have the potential to create new political
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identities and facilitate collective action. Therefore, while prior identities
matter, at certain critical junctures political actors take decisions based on
short-term perceived correlations of forces that, a posteriori, define political
identities.
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Spanish abstract. Este artículo examina las estrategias gubernamentales hacia miem-
bros de los medios de comunicación a la luz del creciente cuestionamiento del papel
de la prensa en la política democrática. Compara las dos primeras presidencias kirch-
eneristas en Argentina con los dos primeros gobiernos encabezados por el PT en Brasil.
Si bien estos gobiernos adoptaron inicialmente estrategias de acomodo, posteriores
crisis políticas perturbaron la coexistencia entre los medios de comunicación y el
gobierno, disparando respuestas diversas. El estudio ofrece un recuento de las opciones
y movimientos políticos de los medios basados en: (i) las limitaciones originadas en las
variables político-estructurales, (ii) las percepciones gubernamentales del poder de los
medios de comunicación opositores y la fuerza de sus aliados de la sociedad civil y (iii)
el aprendizaje a partir de coyunturas críticas que reconfiguraron las preferencias
políticas. En suma, el artículo da pistas sobre las formas en que el universo de los
medios se ha vuelto una arena de la lucha política en Latinoamérica.
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Portuguese abstract. Este artigo examina os fatores determinantes das estratégias gov-
ernamentais em relação a agentes dominantes da mídia sob a luz do crescente questio-
namento do papel da mídia na política democrática. Comparam-se os dois primeiros
mandatos Kirchneristas na Argentina com os dois governos liderados pelo PT no
Brasil. Enquanto estes governos inicialmente adotaram estratégias de acomodação,
crises políticas ulteriormente abalaram a coexistência entre mídia e governo, servindo
de gatilho para reações divergentes. O estudo oferece uma apresentação das opções e
mudanças da política em relação à mídia baseadas em (i) limitações decorrentes de
variáveis político-estruturais, (ii) percepções governamentais em relação ao poder da
mídia oposicionista e da força de aliados da sociedade civil, e (iii) aprendizado a
partir de momentos críticos que reorganizaram as preferências de política. Em
síntese, o artigo oferece insights sobre as maneiras pelas quais o campo da mídia
tornou-se uma arena de disputa política na América Latina.
Portuguese keywords: Clarín, Globo, Mensalão, políticas de mídia, virada à esquerda
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